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The Army and the Lawyer'
BY MILTON J. BLAKE*
Mr. Chairman, honored guests, fellow members of the bar, it is an
honor and a privilege to be here today, together with General McNeil,
Assistant the Judge Advocate General, who is representing the Judge
Advocate General and his department at this meeting. I have been asked
to make a short statement on the subject, "The Army and the Lawyer,"
in line with the theme of the meeting-'"The War Effort-What the
Lawyer Can Do." This subject naturally is divided into two main
parts-The Lawyer in the Army, and The Lawyer in Civilian Practice.
At the outset, it must be understood that the views hereafter expressed
are those of the speaker personally and are not necessarily those of the
Army or the War Department.
What a lawyer in the Army can do in aid of the war effort depends,
of course, upon his military assignment. Those of us who are fortunate
enough to be members of the Judge Advocate General's Department are
using our legal training in the handling of the legal problems of the
Army. Inasmuch as this department is relatively small in numbers,
many of the lawyers in the Army are serving in other fields where their
legal knowledge has little if any direct application. However, a lawyer's
training and experience usually fits him for many of the executive, ad-
ministrative, and personnel functions of the Army. Thus it appears
that the lawyer irt he service can substantially further the war effort by
using his legal knowledge and experience, either directly or indirectly, in
the performance of his assigned duties.
On the other hand, the lawyer in civilian practice, not having his
duties assigned to him as does his brother in the service, must seek oppor-
tu nities to further the war effort.
tThis address was delivered by Major Blake at the American Bar Association's
Regional War meeting in New York City on December 7, 1942. It is printed with the
approval of the War Department,
*Major, the Judge Advocate General's Department of the United States Army.
formerly of the Denver Bar.
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FIELDS OF ACTIVITY
There are many fields in which the civilian lawyer can render service
and assistance to the war effort. One, which I believe is sometimes over-
looked or which does not receive the credit to which it is entitled, is the
faithful and sustained performance of the every-day practice of the law.
With many of the younger attorneys being called into military service,
this function falls largely on the older attorneys, which means, among
other things, that many of the older attorneys. will be called upon more
and more to handle minor, as well as major, legal matters, in order that
no one shall go unrepresented. This is just one of many ways in which
the lawyer can help maintain the home front, that is, the spiritual and
moral foundation of the country without which the war effort could not
be sustained. Above all, it is imperative that the democratic ideal and
the four freedoms, for which we fight, are preserved and protected at
home, a task for which no one is better fitted than the lawyer.
Another field of activity open to the lawyer is the doing of volun-
teer work for the American Red Cross, Army Emergency Relief, scrap
collection drives, War Bond sales, and other similar war activities. There
are many other fields for service, such as the Advisory Boards for Selec-
tive Service registrants and the bar committees on war work, with which
you gentlemen are very familiar. As you know, one of the principal
functions of the bar committees on war work is the furnishing of legal
advice and assistance to military personnel and their dependents. It is
concerning this activity that the following remarks are directed.
PROBLEM OF LEGAL SERVICE FOR
MILITARY PERSONNEL
1. Before Entry.
The problem of furnishing adequate legal advice and assistance
concerning the personal affairs of military personnel is very complex.
Obviously, there is no one better prepared to do this than the service-
man's own personal attorney, if he has one. Likewise, such matters
normally can best be arranged prior to entry on active military service.
For these reasons any person who is about to be inducted or who expects
to be inducted, should be advised and urged to arrange his personal
affairs, with the assistance of an attorney of his own selection, prior to
entry on active duty. The War Department has made provision for the
granting of a short furlough for this purpose to selectees immediately
after induction. However, as many matters require more than the al-
lotted time to arrange, the arrangement thereof prior to induction is
advisable.
The Advisory Boards for Selective Service registrants have been, and
will continue to be. of material assistance in this regard. To aid the
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boards in such matters, the committee on war work of the American Bar
Association has provided them with a manual of law, the second edition
of which has recently been published. The Office of the Judge Advocate
General was pleased to cooperate with the committee in the preparation
of parts of the second edition. I assume that you are familiar with this
manual.
Accordingly, it appears that lawyers acting individually or as mem-
bers of committees on war work or of Selective Service Advisory Boards,
can render important service by urging their clients or persons with
whom they come in contact to arrange their personal affairs prior to
induction, and by otherwise publicizing the advisability of making such
arrangements.
2. After Entry.
After a person has entered upon active military service the proper
handling of his personal affairs, although essentially his own private
business, becomes a matter of concern to the War Department in that his
morale and efficiency as a soldier can be materially affected by such mat-
ters. To assist military personnel in arranging their personal affairs, the
War Department has recently published and distributed throughout the
Army a pamphlet entitled "Personal Affairs of Military Personnel and
Their Dependents." This pamphlet was prepared after thorough study
of the various problems had been made by the several branches of the
service particularly concerned. For example, the section on allotments
of pay was prepared in the Office of the Chief of Finance, and the section
on wills was prepared in the Office of the Judge Advocate General. The
several sections, similarly so prepared, treat with the following subjects
among others:
Sec. III. Transportation of dependents and shipment of household
goods.
Sec. V. Pay, allowances, and allotments of personnel reported
missing in action or captured by the enemy.
Sec. VI. Six months' pay gratuity.
Sec. VIII. Joint bank accounts.
Sec. X. Powers of attorney.
Sec. XI. Estates.
Sec. XIV. Benefits administered by the Veterans Administration
(pensions, government life insurance, national service life insurance, etc.).
Sec. XV. Benefits of Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act of
1942.
Sec. XVI. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as
amended.
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Sec. XIX. Medical attendance for dependents of Army personnel.
Sec. XX. Army emergency relief.
Sec. XXII. American Red Cross.
Sec. XXIII. Burial if death occurs in military service.
In the introductory paragraphs and throughout the pamphlet, it is
pointed out that the advice of legal counsel, necessary to arrange personal
affairs, may properly be sought from any of the following:
(a) The soldier's personal attorney.
(b) Any civilian attorney he may select.
(c) A member of a Selective Service Advisory Board.
(d) A member of a bar committee on war work.
(e) A staff judge advocate or assistant staff judge advocate.
(f) A member of the armed forces who is a licensed attorney.
It is evident that the lawyer, whether he is in the service or not, has
been and will be called upon to render this very important service for
military personnel and their dependents.
For the benefit of those who might wish to obtain a copy of this
pamphlet, I repeat the title-'"Personal Affairs of Military Personnel and
Their Dependents." It can be obtained from the Superintendent of
Documents, Washington, D. C., for ten cents a copy.
3. Personal Affairs Problems.
It is unnecessary to enumerate the many kinds of problems that
arise in the handling of servicemen's personal affairs, as most of them are
the same as those which arise in civil life. However, there are some prob-
lems that are peculiar to, or are affected by, military service. Probably
the most troublesome problem is the many variances in the statutory
and case law of the several states concerning the form, content, interpreta-
tion, execution, acknowledgment and witnessing of written instruments,
particularly wills and powers of attorney. Because of these variances
the Office of the Judge Advocate General has consistently adhered to the
view that such instruments should be tailor-made to fit the jurisdictional
requirements and the particular needs of the individual case, and that the
use of standardized forms should be avoided, except with the advice of
competent counsel. To illustrate this problem, it is not unusual for a
soldier, a legal resident, let us say, of California, who is on duty at
Fort Dix, -New Jersey, and who owns real property in Louisiana, to
request the preparation of a general power of attorney that will enable
his wife to "step into his shoes" in regard to all his property, estate and
affairs. In such a case it is usually necessary to consider the jurisdictional
requirements of the three, or possibly more, states involved, and prepare
the instrument accordingly.
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An interesting phase of this problem concerns the taking of ac-
knowledgments on written instruments at a foreign or overseas place.
Most states require that the place where the acknowledgment is made be
shown on the instrument. As such a showing might disclose the location
or identity of armed forces or other secret military information, military
intelligence officers are sometimes reluctant or unable to permit the deliv-
ery of such instruments. Thus we have legal necessity running head-on
into military necessity. The cure for this situation appears to be the
prompt adoption by the several states of a uniform law which would
remove the requirement that the place of acknowledgment be shown on
instruments executed by persons "serving in or with the armed forces of
the United States." I understand that this matter is being studied by
the Commission on Uniform State Laws and by the New York State
Law Revision Commission, as well as the War Department. It appears
that the bar can render a valuable service by working for the passage of
such a uniform law in the several states.
The same is true as to the persons recognized by the various states
as having authority to take acknowledgments in foreign places. Many
states do not recognize the authority of Army and Navy officers, or cer-
tain classes thereof, to take acknowledgments for service personnel in
foreign places, although the 114th Article of War' provides that:
"Any judge advocate or acting judge advocate, the president
of a general or special court-martial, any summary court-martial,
the trial judge advocate or any assistant trial judge advocate of a
general or special court-martial, the president or the recorder of a
court of inquiry or of a military board, any officer designated to
take a deposition, any officer detailed to conduct an investigation,
and the adjutant of any command * * * in foreign places where
the army may be serving shall have the general powers of a notary
public or of a consul of the United States in the administration of
oaths, the execution and acknowledgment of legal instruments, the
attestation of documents, and all other forms of notarial acts to be
executed by persons subject to military law."
Similar powers were conferred on officers of the Navy and Marine
Corps by the Act of April 25, 1935.2
An amendment to the 114th Article of War is now pending in the
Congress, which proposes to extend such notarial powers to the desig-
nated Army officers, wherever they may be serving. However, it is
doubtful that the passage of this amendment would materially alter the
problem as the recognition of any authority so granted apparently still
'41 Stat. 810: IOU. S.C. 1586.
249 Stat. 161.
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would be, in all but federal transactions, a matter for determination by
the states.
Another troublesome problem, which I am informed is being given
attention by the American Red Cross, as well as other organizations, is
the arrangement of marriages by written contract, radio, cable, and by
proxy, between soldiers overseas and girls in this country who request
such assistance. Many of these requests are for the purpose of avoiding
the illegitimacy of an expected child. Here again the variances in state
laws makes the arrangement of such matters very difficult, especially as
to the question of the legality of so-called common-law marriages.
Other domestic problems frequently arise, such as divorce, alimony
and support money questions, which are difficult of solution because one
of the parties is in the military service. The War Department is fre-
quently asked by the wife or her attorney to take action in such matters,
but obviously it cannot do so directly, as that is a matter for the civil
courts. In cases where it clearly appears that a person in the military
service has not conducted himself honorably in such matters, disciplinary
action may be taken, but such action normally does not result in direct
benefit to the other party. One phase of this problem that should not
be overlooked is the need to guard against the taking of undue advantage
by the soldier, or by the other party, of his military service and the dis-
abilities, restrictions, and benefits resulting therefrom in regard to his
financial position, and his ability to appear and prosecute or defend civil
court actions. in times like these it appears that both parties will some-
times be obliged unavoidably to make sacrifices or suffer prejudices in
these matters. Just as we cannot conduct much of our business as usual,
so also we cannot conduct many personal affairs as usual.
The protection and relief afforded the serviceman in these and many
other matters by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as
amended, is a subject upon which so much has been said and written as
to make a discussion thereof unnecessary at this time. Suffice it to say
that the law confers large discretionary powers on the civil courts which
alone can determine whether the law applies in any given case. Conse-
quently, the War Department has refused repeatedly to interpret the
law or to express a view as to its applicability.
Time does not permit of a discussion of the many other problems
that have arisen or may arise in the handling of servicemen's personal
affairs.
SERVICEMEN'S LEGAL AID CLINICS
As indicated by the foregoing remarks, there is much to be done by
the lawyers both in and out of the service for the American soldier and
his dependents. The question that next arises is bow this work can be
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accomplished, that is, how can the lawyer and the soldier come in contact,
so that the one can help the other?
Throughout the country, many plans and ideas have been sug-
gested and developed concerning this problem. I believe that most of
you have read or heard about the so-called legal aid clinic that has been
in operation at Lowry Field, Colorado, since last spring. It is perhaps
the most ambitious attempt that has been made so far to solve this prob-
lem; certainly it has provided a comprehensive experimental test. The
reports from Lowry Field indicate that such a plan is practicable and
has done and can do a large amount of good under competent and
enthusiastic leadership. I personally had the good fortune to visit the
Lowry Field clinic this fall to observe and study its plan of operation.
Briefly, that plan provides for the reference of the legal problems of the
serviceman to the local committee on war work or other civilian attorneys
by lawyer-officers who have interviewed the soldier and determined his
needs. Many minor matters can be disposed of by the lawyer-officers
without reference to civilian lawyers, other matters require civilian han-
dling, such as those involving court appearance. Periodically groups of
volunteer civilian lawyers visit the post to interview and advise military
personnel concerning their legal problems. Thus it can be seen that the
plan provides a method of contact between the soldier, the lawyer in the
service, and the civilian lawyer.
The committee on war work of the American Bar Association
and the Office of the Judge Advocate General have been working in
cooperation for some time in an attempt to evolve a legal aid clinic plan
that can be established uniformly throughout the military establishment.
A proposed plan, based on the many plans and suggestions that have
been proposed, including the Lowry Field plan, has been prepared and
submitted to the War Department for consideration. It is hoped that
this or some other feasible plan will be adopted and put into effect at an
early date. If and when that happens the civilian lawyers will have
open to them a new way to be of service. In.the meantime their present
activities in this regard should be continued and increased.
In conclusion, I would like to express my personal appreciation for
the splendid cooperation and assistance that has been extended to me and
other members of the Judge Advocate General's Department during the
past year, by your president, Mr. Morris, and by Mr. Gregory and Mr.
Beckwith, the present and former chairmen of the committee on war
work. The solution of many problems of mutual interest, such as those
previously discussed, has been the objective of our collaboration. I hope
I have given you a better understanding of the various problems involved,
of what has been and is being done to solve them, and of how the law-
yer, both in and out of the service, has been and can be of great service
to the American soldier, the Army, and to the war effort in general.
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Some Decisions Concerning Electric
Power Line Easements
BY CHARLES J. BEISE*
This is the modern version of Jack and the Bean Stalk--only Jack
is a farmer and the giant the high tension power line. You plant a
bean and its grows-it's all as simple as that. But just how far the bean
can grow, the courts have tried to determine for the past forty years.
Generally speaking, it can grow into a lot of trouble.
The right of way man does his best to honestly explain the ease-
ment form he submits to the farmer, and his sincere, frank discussion
at this point of negotiations can do much to avoid possible future mis-
understandings. However, there are frequently complex legal and engi-
neering questions involved.
For instance, the ordinary power line easement grants "the right to
enter upon the right of way (ordinarily a given distance on each side of
the center line) and to survey, construct, maintain, operate, control, and
use said transmission line and to remove objects interfering therewith."
The farmer reserves "the right to cultivate, use, and occupy said premises
for any purpose consistent with the rights and privileges above granted,"
and "which will not interfere with or endanger any of the equipment of
the grantee."
But what about that word "consistent," tle word "interfere" or
the word "endanger"? Certainly the farmer can raise row crops under-
neath the line, or grain, even corn. But how about fruit trees or shade
trees? Sometimes a farmer wants to build a shed, granary or house on
the right of way. On the other hand, the power line operators may
want to fence it, to cut trees down, to modernize their lightning pro-
tectors.
These are every-day problems in the operation of an electrical trans-
mission line and relatively little precedent exists to furnish a satisfactory
guide.
The Alabama Power Company1 used an easement containing the
general provisions (slightly modified). above quoted and "all the rights
*Formerly of the Durango bar, now with the United States Bureau of Reclama-
tion, Salt Lake City.
'Collins v. Alabama Power Co., 214 Ala. 643, 108 So. 868, 46 A. L. R. 1459
(1926).
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and privileges therein necessary or convenient for the full enjoyment of
the use thereof for the purpose above described," also "the right to cut
and keep clear all trees and undergrowth and other obstructions on said
strip." Everyone was happy until farmer Collins (no relation to Tom)
built himself a house 25 feet long, of which 15 feet was on the right of
way. The wires cleared the top of the house by 25 feet. Farmer Col-
lins didn't object to having the lines over his house and couldn't see why
the company did. But it did. The court required the removal of the
house, saying:
"We think that there can be no doubt that the dwelling house
resting in part upon complainant's right of way is an obstruction
such as complainant sought to guard against when it took a grant
of its right of way from Evans (landowner). It involves not only
an obstruction to complainant's movements along its lines, but also
is so located in its relation to its power lines as to constitute a hazard
of no small concern to both the complainant and the occupants of
the building. Moreover, the situation shown by the agreed state-
ment of facts is one which if acquiesced in by complainant may be
expected under the peculiar status of the law declared in S. A. L. R.
Company. vs. Banks, 92 So. 117, to invite controversy as to the
right and title of difficult solution, such as any prudently managed
business corporation would seek to avoid."
With reference to general farming purposes, the court said the owner
"has the right to use such strip of land for any purpose which does not
conflict with the paramount rights of complainant, and subject to such
rights, may cultivate the same, pass along, and across it and generally use
it in any way which does not affect the rights of the complainant
herein."
Not all obstructions are houses. A farmer can certainly lay a loose
wood plank on the right of way, or two or three, but when his pile of
lumber gets to be 15 feet high, he has troubles. At least Kesterson did.
2
The wires broke, and a fire resulted, destroying Kesterson's lumber. He
sued for damages. The power company secured an easement from the
owner containing generally the provisions above noted and also "to
maintain gates at all fences crossed by said lines and to keep private locks
thereon." Owner reserved "right to cultivate said right of way and
otherwise use and enjoy the same." The court, refusing damages, said:
"We cannot conceive that any ordinary power line will stand
perpetually without repair. This involves the necessity of hauling
2Kesterson v. California-Oregon Power Co., 228 Pac. 1092 (Ore. 1924), rev'd
on other grounds in 114 Ore. 22, 228 Pac. 1092.
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upon the right of way materials with which to maintain the line,
such as poles, etc. How can this be accomplished if the right of way
is obstructed by piles of lumber 15 feet high * * *? The phrase
'otherwise use and enjoy the same' should not be construed to let in
every kind of occupancy 'otherwise' than cultivation for that would
defeat the very deed. The 'otherwise' enjoyment clause cannot be
construed to nullify or destroy the provisions of the deed itself."
Sometimes jurors ask embarrassing questions. In the trial of a
condemnation suit in Kentucky, 3 where the power company sought a
right of way, the jury asked the court if the land owner would have the
right to bring coal and timber out over the strip of land condemned.
The trial court answered the question, saying the company had "the
exclusive right to said easement and privileges if it sees fit to exercise
them." The appellate court reversed the case because of the answer to
the jury and said:
"Use of an easement must be as reasonable and as little bur-
densome to the servient estate as the nature of the easement and
object of it will permit * * *. The land owners had a perfect right
to use the strips sought to be condemned * * * in any way they
saw fit, * * * including the removal of coal and timber from the
remaining lands."
In Alabama, the Keystone Lime Company 4 maintained it had a
right to remove minerals from the right of way for the power line. This
contention was sustained by the court, saying:
"The condemnation proceedings do not touch the land own-
ership of the minerals on the strip, if there are minerals there, nor
do they preclude the land owner from taking minerals therefrom,
provided this is done in such a way as not to obstruct the use by
power company of so much of the surface as it may now need or
need in the future for the proper maintenance of its appliances for
conducting electricity."
So far as the farmer is concerned, it may be stated that he is entitled
to use the right of way, provided such use does not impair, obstruct or
endanger the power line. What constitutes impairment or obstruction
is, however, a question largely of fact, dependent on the facts of each
case. No general factual observation or rule can be laid down.
3Kentucky and West Virginia Power Co. v. Elkhorn City Land Co., 212 Ky.
624, 279 S.W. 1082 (1926).
'Alabama Power Co. v. Keystone Lime Co., 191 Ala. 58, 67 So. 833, Ann. Cas.
1917 C. 878 (1915).
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On the other hand, the power company, too, is restricted in the
exercise of its rights. The question sometimes arises whether the right
of way for the line can be fenced where no specific provision for fencing
has been sought or obtained. This point arose in Alabama Power Com-
pany v. Keystone Lime Company,5 and the court said:
"Land owners have the right to cultivate the land, to go
across it and generally * * * to use it in any way which does not
affect the paramount right of the power company. Power com-
pany has no right * * * and there is in the nature of things no
reason for it * * * to fence either side of the right of way."
And in Alabama in another case,' the court left no doubt in the
jurors' minds when it said, "I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that the
A. P. Company acquires no right to fence either side of the right of way
involved in this case."
Fencing is a matter which may be governed by state statute, hence
the statutes of each state must be consulted, regardless of decisions in
another state. Generally speaking, unless the fee title to a definite strip
of land is acquired, no right of fencing exists.
For crossing a lake, a lineman's dream is a bridge across the lake
and immediately under the power line. For a while the dream came true,
but the Public Service Gas and Electric Company's employees now have
to row because a court required it 7 and the bridge was torn down. The
power company used a general form of easement, and the lake owner
reserved the "fee simple and full and complete enjoyment of and domin-
ion over the granted premises for any use or purpose not inconsistent."
In the middle of the lake was an island which the power company con-
nected to the mainland by a board walk 5 feet wide and 2,600 feet long,
3 feet above the surface of the lake. The bridge interfered with boating.
The lake was too shallow for the power company's crews to use a boat
all the way. Result-the bridge was required to be dismantled and a
channel under the line dredged for maintenance boats, and in return, the
lake owner was required to keep the lake at a constant level. The moral
to the story is that when a bridge is contemplated, specific permission for
its construction and maintenance should be secured.
Trees cause trouble. Adam and Eve got in a jam because of a fruit
tree, but the Wisconsin and Minnesota Light and Power Company had
their day in court because of 108 shade trees.8 Instead of the ordinary
'Ibid.
'Alabama Power Co. v. Sides, 212 Ala. 687, 103 So. 859 (1925).
7Lidgerwood Estates, Inc. v. Public Service Gas Z$ Electric Co., 113 N. J. Eq. 403,
167 Atl. 197 (1933).
8Brown v. Wisconsin-Minnesota Light V3 Power Co., 170 Wis. 288, 174 N. W.
903 (1919).
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easement, the company took an option to buy a 50-foot strip of ground
which contained the restriction, "trees to be so trimmed as not to inter-
fere with the lines." The contract provided that the money paid by the
power company "is in full payment for all damages caused by the cutting
of timber on all lands owned by us (landowner) which may be found
necessary in order to leave the lines safe from failing timber." The
court in sustaining the right of the farmer to recover damages for cutting
trees, said:
"We think the provision with regard to the trimming of trees
* * * is not unreasonable * * *. They unquestionably desired to
retain the trees as far as was consistent with the operation of the
electric transmission wires, and this desire was expressed in the
words 'trees to be trimmed so as not to interfere with the lines'."
Where numerous trees are to be cut, it is advisable to specifically
provide for the cutting, and omission of any reference to trimming is
desirable. The case is of interest in another point in that the court
indicated that a ten-foot clearance of trees by power line was a safe
practice.
Apparently the court didn't have the same trouble in reading a
contract in Texas. 9 The easement read, "to remove from said land all
trees and parts thereof or other obstructions which endanger or may inter-
fere with the safety or efficiency of said line or its appurtenances and the
right to exercise all other rights hereby granted," and the court said,
"Under that instrument, the company had the authority to remove trees
or parts thereof that obstructed its right of way across said land and
there would be no ground for recovery unless it was shown that company
had unnecessarily destroyed the trees." Of interest also is the statement
in the case that merely because the owner fears the wire might break and
injure him does not entitle recovery of damages because of such fears.
Some states have specific statutes permitting the power company to
remove all timber on the right of way and outside of the right of way
such timber as may endanger the line by falling. This is the situation
in Alabama. Few, if any, such statutes exist in other states.
The problems of a power company are not limited to trees and
bridges. Frequently, it is necessary to modernize transmission lines by
installing lightning protectors. This was the situation of the Pennsyl-
vania Water and Power Company. 10 The company held an easement
which did not describe the width of the right of way or the center line,
'Central Power t Light Co. v. Johnston, 24 S. W. (2d) 762 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930).
"0Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Reigart, 127 Pa. Super. 600, 193 At.
311 (1937).
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but included the right "of entry, construction, and operation, right to
cut or trim trees, and the right to build from time to time on said
right of way such additional lines as they (power company) wish."
The number of structures was limited to one. To decrease lightning
trouble, twelve years after the line was built, the company buried in the
ground 20 inches deep two wires connecting towers and outside of the
former right of way (in part) and also static wires on top of towers
but inside the right of way. The company sought an injunction
against interference by the farmer. The court said:
"Where limits of right of way are not set by instrument,
parties by acts can establish it to mutual consent, but once set, it
cannot be changed at pleasure of grantee. It is clear that the plac-
ing of the counterpoise in the ground and beyond the limits of the
right of way as established imposed an additional servitude on
defendant's land."
As to overhead wires,
"They do not interfere with the use of the surface and are
located within the limits of the span of the power line. * * * These
overhead lightning resistors are within such limits and add no real
burden on the land."
Other companies have left the description of their right of way
uncertain.1" When the company tried to alter the location of the line
after it was constructed, the court said, "An indefinite right of way
description once made certain by reason of location and construction of
a line cannot be thereafter altered at mere pleasure of grantee."
In conclusion, it is suggested that the right to fence, to cut or trim
trees, to construct a bridge, or to exercise any unusual powers in connec-
tion with a power line should be specifically provided for. Caution
should be exercised in using one standard form of easement for all tracts
of land crossed. In case some unusual structure is contemplated or a
variation from the general scheme, the attorney in charge of right of way
should be first consulted before contacting the landowner.
The foregoing cases referred to constitute most of the decisions in
the United States concerning power line easements. Generally speaking,
such easements are subject to the same interpretation and subject to the
same limitations as apply to easements of other types. Because of the
relatively few years that power lines have been in use, little specific judi-
cial precedent exists to guide the right-of-way engineer and attorney.
'Tennessee Public Service Co. v. Price, 16 Tenn. App. 58, 65 S. W. (2d) 879
(1932).
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What Can I Do To Help?
BY GILL ROBB WILSON*
1. Thou shalt keep thy mouth shut.
2. Thou shalt stay out of Washington, both thou and thy conven-
tions and -thy car and thy family and thy family's family and all
thy correspondence and thy personal problems; none of these shalt
thou bring to Washington, for they clutter up the works.
3. Thou shalt not harass thy son because he hath not a commission;
neither shalt thou make him to feel the service of an enlisted man
to be beneath his college education and thy colonial background;
neither shall these things be held against him by other enlisted men
if thou dost not make of them an abomination.
4. Thou shalt not hoard; only the squirrel hoardeth and this he doeth
because he is a squirrel.
5. Thou shalt not get ants in thy pants to put on a uniform only
because thou art vain and hast no courage to hoe thy row in the
place where thou art most needed.
6. Thou shalt walk; even thus shalt thou aid to save gas and rubber;
thus shalt thou redeem the price of thy girdle and thy doctor's bill
and thy very hide.
7. Thou shalt not strike, neither shalt thou walk out; neither shalt
thou lock out; neither shalt thou sit down on the job; in order that
thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy God hath
given thee.
8. Thou shalt not in thy confidence measure the seas, for verily they
who have thought to hide behind the seas are full of prune juice.
9. Thou shalt not fret because of evil-doers for thou hast not done so
well thyself.
10. Thou shalt not lose faith; thou hast lost nothing beyond recovery
if thy faith be not lost.
*President of the National Aeronautic Association. Reprinted by permission from
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS.
Are You Investing 10% of Your
Income in War Bonds?
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Where There's A Will There's A Way
By ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT*
Many members of the bar are aware that there is an all too preva-
lent custom for people with comparatively small estates to obtain the
services of a notary public in preparing their wills. Undoubtedly many
of us have had personal experience and many gray hairs as a result
of trying to figure out what these wills mean and also trying to see
that the property of the decedent finally reaches those whom the decedent
intended should have it. In a recent case the Supreme Court of Colorado
was presented with a problem involving a will which was drawn by a
notary public. The comments of the court are significant, not so much
for what they did say, but rather for what the court neglected to say.
It is rather interesting to trace through two or three recent cases
concerning the attitude of the Supreme Court toward the drafting of
wills.
In People, ex rel. v. Denver Clearing House Banks' the court held
that the drafting of wills by banks and trust companies constitutes the
practice of law and that such actions by such institutions were not proper.
The court said:
"We think the drawing of wills, as a practice, is the practice
of law, and this for three reasons: First, because of the profound
legal knowledge necessary for one who makes a practice of this
work; second, because all these instruments, before they become
effective, must be filed in and administered by a court; and third,
because what we consider the weight of authority so holds."
The court was then presented, in People, ex rel. v. Jersin,2 with
a problem of a notary public who admitted drafting a will for a friend
and the court was requested to hold the said notary in contempt for prac-
ticing law without a license. The court held the notary was not in con-
tempt and the test of whether or not he was practicing law in drawing
this will was whether or not he made a practice of drafting wills. It
seems clear in reading the decision that the reason the court refused to
punish the notary for contempt was that the notary did not make it a
practice to draft wills because the court found that he had only prepared
one will. This test is an extremely interesting one and it may be said
to parallel the proverbial holding in the case of a vicious dog that every
dog is entitled to at least one bite. Let it not be said that our canine
*Of the Denver Bar.
'99 Colo. 50, 59 P. (2d) 468 (1936).
'101-Colo. 406, 74 P. (2d) 668 (1937).
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friends enjoy more privileges than are accorded others. It is, therefore,
the law of our land that every notary is entitled to at least one will.
In the third case, In re Maikka's Estate,3 the court noted these facts
in connection with the drafting of a will:
"Hawkins, the scrivener, and one of the subscribing witnesses,
though not a lawyer, had been a member of the Colorado General
Assembly. He was a notary public in the town of Paonia, and, as
is frequently the case, assisted citizens of the community in drawing
legal papers, and filling out printed forms a supply of which he kept
on hand."
The word "frequently" in this decision deserves special attention.
If this particular notary public "frequently ... assisted citizens of the
community in drawing legal papers. . ." we begin to become suspi-
ciously close to the practice of law as defined by the court in the Denver
Banks case. If the court meant only that notaries public in general fre-
quently assisted citizens of the community in drawing legal papers (pre-
sumably including wills) then it is difficult to see why notaries public
in general who do that kind of work are not practicing law.
This is not a mere abstract question, nor is it only a matter of
academic interest. One need only read further in the opinion of the
Maikha case to see what kind of legal advice notaries public give their
clients. In this case the testatrix wished to make a will leaving all the
property to her daughter. She did not want to leave -her sons anything.
The legal advice given by the notary public was as follows:
"I told her it would not make a legal will-that she had to
mention the boys-leave them something * * * I told her she
would have to will them at least a dollar. And she said: 'Well,
put it in that way.' * * * She said she wanted to leave it all to
her daughter. * * *
Q. "And you drew the will that way? A. Yes, sir. * * *"
Any lawyer will readily observe that this is not the law in Colo-
rado and it is-not clear from the case whether the litigation was a direct
result of having the will drawn by a notary public who in the nature of
things cannot have that "profound legal knowledge" which the Supreme
Court said was necessary for one who made a practice of drawing wills.
The unfortunate thing is that the Supreme Court did not see fit
to comment upon the fact that the will was drawn by a notary nor did
it see fit to condemn the practice as a practice, nor did it see fit to point
3126 P. (2d) 855 (Colo., 1942).
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out that the legal advice given by that particular notary was not correct
nor accurate.
It seems reasonably certain that any notary public who might read
the decision would come to certain conclusions:
I. Other notaries "frequently" draft legal papers (presumably
including wills).
2. The Supreme Court of Colorado does not discourage nor con-
demn the practice.
3. The advice given in the case last cited as to the method of dis-
inheriting children was sound and proper since the Supreme
Court did not indicate that the statement of law by the notary
was erroneous.
We all realize that notaries need no encouragement in the practice
of drafting legal papers and it is deeply regretted that when such situa-
tions do reach the Supreme Court that the court does not discourage the
practice or at least call attention to the fact that such acts by persons
not qualified inevitably result in legal advice which is not accurate and,
therefore, inevitably result in unnecessary litigation.
American Bar Association to Cooperate
with War Manpower Commission
The American Bar Association committee on coordination and
direction of war effort, under the chairmanship of George M. Morris, has
worked out a program for cooperating with the War Manpower Com-
mission and the United States Employment Service in meeting vital man-
power requirements of the war effort. Briefly the program embraces four
general activities: (1) "Referral services" are to be established to refer
to competent attorneys the legal problems of workers transferred from
one community to another. (2) Arrangements are being made to pro-
vide adequate legal talent to communities created or greatly enlarged by
war industries or activities. (3) Comprehensive plans have been in-
augurated for assisting the United States Employment Service in train-
ing and placing lawyers desirous of entering directly into war production
and related industries. (4) And the association is cooperating with the
National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel in plans for regis-
tering all lawyers, thus providing a pool for placements in professional
and technical work where personnel shortages exist.
Much of the work in the development of the program will be car-
ried on by the state and local bar associations.
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Bar Leader Discovers New Law*
Do you know about the law of "provoke?"
Well, neither did Tappan Gregory, of the American Bar Associa-
tion's War Work Committee, but when he was asked by a soldier for a
list of states recognizing the law of provoke, he decided to look into the
matter. Another prominent Chicago lawyer, Charles P. Megan, put
him on the trail of the leading case on this subject, reported in the Akron,
Indiana, News, of January 1, 1929, as follows:
"PENCE-HARMON CASES ARE SETTLED SATURDAY
"Justice of Peace Monroe Morris has had very busy sessions recent-
ly. * ** Saturday morning at ten o'clock the case in which Fern Harmon,
plaintiff, charged Walter Pence, defendant, with provoke was started
after the plaintiff refused to settle by paying half of the court costs.
Mrs. Harmon called for a jury trial. Justice of Peace Monroe Morris
then ordered the constable, Frank Bright, who deputized G. W. Kline,
to find four men for a jury. After four men had been secured for a jury
it was found that a full jury of twelve was required for the case. It
was decided to try the case at the public library due to the lack of room.
After a period of time the constable and deputy drafted what men they
*Reprinted by permission of the COURT AND COMMERCIAL NEWS SERVICE.
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could find about town and after seating them discovered they had four-
teen. Two of the men were then released. The justice of peace then
asked the plaintiff and the defendant if they had any objections. Fred
Blackburn secured his release after asking the defendant to object to him
being on the jury.
"The evidence was then heard and the jury was taken to the engine
room in the library by the constable who remained with them. The
question they were to decide on was, whether Pence was 'guilty' of
provoke or 'not guilty.' After being out about five minutes the jury
did not know whether they were trying the case in which Pence was
the defendant or the case tried two weeks previous in which Pence was
the plaintiff, in which he charged Mrs. Harmon with provoke. (Here
the narrative is somewhat garbled, but apparently the case heard two
weeks earlier was continued to this same Saturday at 2 p. m.) The jus-
tice of peace then went to the jury room and cleared the argument as
to what case they were trying. At 12:15 the jury had not agreed so
they adjourned for noon. During the noon hour Roscoe Davis informed
the constable that he would be unable to serve on the jury in the after-
noon as he had to carry the mail. He was told to write a number of
votes and give them to the constable, who later turned them over to the
deputy, who was to hand one in every time the jury voted. After
several votes the jury began turning just opposite to what the Davis votes
were. Finally his vote was the only one remaining which found Pence
'not guilty,' so the constable said he would take it upon himself to change
Davis' vote from 'not guilty' to 'guilty.' After this change the jury
was agreed.
"The jury came out and the verdict was the defendant was found
guilty, but there were only eleven chairs in the jury box filled.
"It was then found out that irregularities had taken place and
Pence demanded the case be thrown out.
"The case was then set for retrial at four o'clock. At this time it
was agreed to settle both cases by paying the costs, which amounted to
$2.28 each."
Stoner Is New Member of Board of Governors
The board accepted the resignation of Arthur Aldrich from the
First Judicial District, and accepted the appointment of Christian D.
Stoner of Golden to replace him. Mr. Aldrich is moving from Idaho
Springs to Washington. Special commendation was extended to Charles
Rosenbaum of Denver, whose committee on sustaining membership has
added many such members to the rolls for this year.
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Temporary Restraining Orders and Injunctions
On Ex Parte Applications Without
Notice to Defendant
BY GEORGE F. DUNKLEE*
An application in case No. A-34116, Mulvihill v. Mulvihill, came
on for heating before me as presiding judge May 25th, 1942, based on
a verified petition in the usual form, which was granted and duly served,
and the defendant ejected from his home at 222 Gaylord Street by the
sheriff, as ordered by the court. The defendant then being so ejected
committed suicide.
This unfortunate result caused the court to make an investigation
of the facts and a study of the law that might be of value to the profes-
sion as a precedent in such ex parte applications without notice to a
defendant in divorce cases, and thereby avoid in the future an injustice
therein.
THE LAW
1st. Rule 65 is as follows:
"(a) Preliminary notice. No preliminary injunction shall be
issued without notice to the adverse party."
2nd. "C (h) When inapplicable. This rule shall not apply to
suits for divorce, alimony, separate maintenance or custody of infants.
In such suits, the court may make prohibitive or mandatory orders, with-
out notice or bond, as may be just." (Effective April 6, 1941, p. 1 of
rules.)
3rd. This provision "C (h) When inapplicable," is a new harsh
provision without previous precedent in this jurisdiction.
A. There was no similar provision in the Code of Civil Procedure.
B. There is no such provision in the federal rules.
C. In the case of Sedgwick v. Sedgwick,1 at page 168 of opinion,
the court said:
"Whether the district court possesses inherent common-law
power to issue restraining orders in proper cases, in divorce actions,
without notice and without bond, we express no opinion."
*Formerly presiding judge of the Denver district courts. This opinion has been
sent in pamphlet form by Judge Dunklee to all the district judges of the state. We
reprint it, at Judge Dunklee's suggestion, so that the attorneys of the state may have
ready,access to the same opinion.
'50 Colo. 164, 114 Pac. 488, Ann. Cas. 1912C 653 (1911).
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4th. These applications for restraining orders and injunctions
without notice to the defendant are generally made as soon as the cases
have been filed in the clerk's office and before they have been regularly
assigned to any division, and therefore regularly come before the presid-
ing judge for his action.
5th. The Honorable Stanley H. Johnson was presiding judge
from April 6th, 1941, to January 12th, 1942. During that time I
find, from the records of the clerk's office, there were seventy-six such
restraining orders and injunctions granted without notice to the defend-
ant as per said rule.
6th. That from said 12th day of January, 1942, to May 25th,
1942, I was the presiding judge, and granted twenty-two (22) such
injunctions and restraining orders without notice on similar applications
as per said rule.
7th. That on said May 25th, 1942, the said Mulvihill case, No.
A-34116, came before me ex parte for a similar restraining order, which
was granted as per the files and records of said cause.
8th. The defendant was duly served at his family hame, 222
Gaylord Street, by the undersheriff, as shown by the record. Mr. Mulvi-
hill 'phoned his attorney, who arrived at the home about 7:30 P. M.
After a consultation he was advised to obey the order of the court, and
that they would take up the legal matters later. Mr. Mulvihill then said
several times, quoting from his attorney's report to the court, " 'It is the
most humiliating thing that has ever happened to me.' He then packed
up; bade goodbye to his family, consisting of wife and three boys. He
then left through a side door with his bags, got into his car, backed out
into the street." The defendant, then being so ejected, went out into the
country and committed suicide.
9th. After this unfortunate event I requested a report (contained
in full in the record, Exhibit A) from the defendant's attorney. Also
a report (Exhibit Al) from the undersheriff, who served it upon the
defendant, in order to make a record of the facts as they saw them in
the defendant's home. The object of this investigation by the court
and these reports was to get the facts as to how this ex parte restraining
order worked out in this case.
The attorney closed his report with these words:
"He was quite manly about the whole affair, spoke well of
his wife, refused to go into the details of his troubles and of course
showed the deepest affection for his children, as did both of the
older boys in their talks with me."
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The undersheriff in his report uses the following language:
"I do feel, however, that the issuing of restraining orders and
forcing parties to leave their house without being heard is generally
a bad practice. In the seven years that I have been in this office, I
have handled nearly all matters of this kind personally and I know
full well that in not a single case so far has there been any imme-
diate danger, and if both parties had been heard I am certain that
any serious consequences could have been avoided.
"The same thing is true of ne exeats. I haven't found a single
case of that kind in my experience where a hearing with both par-
ties present could not have resulted in a better understanding and,
I believe, a satisfactory determination of the action at issue," etc.
10th. After the unfortunate result of that case, I, as presiding judge
of the court, refused, in my discretion, to grant any such ex parte order
against husband.or wife, depriving them of home or children, without a
hearing after due notice.
1 I th. I call attention, by way of illustration, to the following
cases, giving the numbers of the cases as they appear in the clerk's office,
but omitting the names of the parties.
A. On June 16tb, 1942, in case No. A-34319, for separate main-
tenance, the wife came into court with her attorney, with a complaint in
due form, asking an ex parte restraining order against the husband from
molesting or interfering with the plaintiff. The court informed the
attorney that since the Muluihill case it was not granting such injunc-
tions and restraining orders without notice to the defendant. Upon
inquiry the court was informed that the defendant was employed right
in the municipal building where the court was being held. By request
of the court the defendant was notified, and immediately came into
court, much surprised at what was going on, as he and the plaintiff were
living together with their three children in their home, jointly owned
by them up to that very time. The plaintiff was sworn and testified,
but did not prima facie substantiate her complaint. The defendant then
and there took the stand and testified, denying any cause for making the
complaint. The attorney for the plaintiff, upon hearing their testimony,
with the consent of his client, then and there dismissed the case.
B. In case No. A-35544, filed October 28th, 1942, by the hus-
band against his wife, was an application for an ex parte restraining
order, and asking,
"That this court enter a restraining order herein restraining
and enjoining the defendant, either directly or indirectly from in-
terfering with this plaintiff, from going to his place of business, and
from calling up and contacting the friends and business. associates
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of this plaintiff, and from making any remarks to them concerning
this plaintiff."
The court informed the attorney it was requiring that a notice be
given to defendant in all such cases before hearing or making such orders.
The record shows no further action in said case.
12th. Numerous other cases could be cited as filed in the clerk's
office of similar purport.
All such cases that asked the ejecting of the husband or wife out of
the home were denied a hearing until a notice was given the defendant.
As a result, as shown by the records, seldom is any notice ever served and
the injunction feature is generally abandoned.
13th. The rule says that these drastic orders may be made ex parte
"without notice or bond, as may be just." I submit that the court is
not in a position to do justice in an ex parte hearing without notice in a
domestic relations case between husband and wife involving the right of
either to be ejected from the home, or an order restraining the defendant
from speaking or communicating with plaintiff until further order of
court, a violation of which order will subject the defendant to punish-
ment for contempt of court.
14th. The records of this court show that where these harsh orders
are made by the court without notice to the husband or the wife in such
cases, ejecting a defendant from his or her home, changing the custody of
infants, and the like, creates a situation where there is no likelihood for
a reconciliation between them. I do not recall of a single case in my
experience where a reconciliation was thereafter brought about between
the parties.
15th. There is another reason, in my opinion, why those harsh
orders are unnecessary as a matter of protection of a defendant. Such a
preliminary injunction or restraining order is of no effect upon a defend-
ant until served. I respectfully submit that when a defendant is served
with a copy of a petition br complaint, summons and notice to appear
in court on a day certain, when such an order is to be asked for, that
notice and papers so served have all of the restraining effect on a defend-
ant as a restraining order without notice does not create a feeling that an
unfair prejudicial order does which has been entered without an oppor-
tunity to be heard.
16th. I find that on the face of it, a rule that safeguards defend-
ants' interests in their property rights, as to preliminary injunction, by
requiring a notice and bond, and all the safeguards of having the injunc-
tion "expire by its terms within such time after entry not to exceed 10
days," etc.. as provided in said Rule 65 (a) to (d), that it is unreason-
DICTA
able, inequitable and against public policy that a husband or wife in
divorce or other proceedings may be ejected from their home or deprived
of the custody of their "infants," without notice to them as a defendant
in the case of the time and place of such an application, or hearing before
the court, but instead a private ex parte hearing, even though the defend-
ant may be at that time in the home-in a place of business in the city,
or even in the building where the court is being held, as per the instances
as above stated.
17th. But it has been argued that said rule gives the court author-
ity to proceed without notice to a defendant husband or wife, but the
rule further says, "as may be just."
The construction of the phrase "as may be just" is squarely up to
the court to say whether it is "just" for a husband or wife to come into
court ex parte and get drastic orders of ejecting either one or the other
out of the home in "divorce, alimony, separate maintenance or custody
of infants" without notice to the husband or wife.
The word "just" has been defined by many authorities. I will
only cite the following, "Volume 23, Words and Phrases, permanent
edition." I quote therefrom, p. 436:
"The word 'just' is derived from the Latin 'justus,' which is from
the Latin 'jus,' which means a right, and more technically a legal right-
a law. Thus 'jus dicere' was to pronounce the judgment; to give the
legal decision.
"The word 'just' is defined by the Century Dictionary as right in
law or ethics, and in the Standard Dictionary as conforming to the re-
quirements of right or of positive law, and in Anderson's Law Diction-
ary as probable, reasonable. Kinney's Law Dictionary defines 'just' as
fair, adequate, reasonable, probable; and justa causa as a just cause, a
lawful ground."
Volume 35 Corpus Juris, on page 431, I quote as follows:
"92. A maxim meaning 'Law is the science of what is good
and just.'
"93. A maxim meaning 'Law is a rule of right; and what-
ever is contrary to the rule of right is an injury.'
"94. A maxim meaning 'Right and fraud never dwell to-
gether.'
"95. A maxim meaning 'A right does (or can) not arise
out of a wrong.' "
18th. The court finds from the records that from the date when
said rule was effective, April 6th, 1941, to May 25th, 1942, the date of
the Mulvihill case, that ninety-eight (98) such injunctions and restrain-
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ing orders were granted ex parte and without notice to the defendant, as
aforesaid.
After the above said case the court made an investigation of the
facts and a study of the law as hereinbefore stated, and in all subsequent
applications for such injunctions and restraining orders in suits for
"divorce, alimony, separate maintenance or custody of infants," the
court ruled that the husband or wife as defendant therein must be given
notice of the time and place of hearing so as to have an opportunity to
appear before the court and be heard.
The records of the court show that after said ruling the applications
for such ex parte injunctions and restraining orders, ejecting one or the
other from the family home without notice, etc., rapidly fell off, and at
the present time have entirely stopped.
The court finds from experience and investigation that it is inequi-
table, unfair, unjust and against public policy, to make such orders
against a husband or wife without notice having first been given the
defendant.
The court rules that it cannot be in a position to make an order in
such cases "as may be just" without notice to a defendant, so that it can
hear both sides of the domestic controversy if a defendant cares to contest.
That to proceed otherwise as against the person in a divorce case, as dis-
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